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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
I.

ISSUE ON REVIEW.

In its responsive brief on review, the State contends that the Appellant, Junior Larry
Hillbroom ("Hillbroom"), failed to set forth a question presented for review in his Brief in
Support of Petition for Review. Respondent's brief, p.2. Hillbroom's brief was not intended to
address the merits of the case but rather to address whether this Court should accept review
pursuant to criteria set forth in I.A.R. 11 S(b ). Hillbroom set forth a concise statement of the
issue on review in his opening brief, which he incorporates herein by reference:
Is a no contact order invalid under I.C. § 18-920 where it fails
to contain a date certain for expiration?

Br. of Appellant, p.5.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Hillbroom agrees with and adopts the standard of review set forth by the State in its
Respondent's Brief on Review. Respondent's Br., pp. 3-4.
III.

ARGUMENT.
A.

An order issued pursuant to I.C. § 18-920 that fails to comply with I.C.R.
46.2 is not a no contact order; it's a plain vanilla court order.

The State argues that a no contact order that fails to comply with the mandatory
provisions of I.C.R. 46.2, nonetheless, remains valid under I.C. § 18-920. The State is wrong.
The statute and criminal rule must be read together and both must be satisfied in order to obtain a
conviction. Contrary to the State's contention, Criminal Rule 46.2 is not inconsistent with the
substantive provisions of the statute because I.C.R. 46.2 merely distinguishes a no contact order
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punishable under LC. § 18-920 from a plain vanilla court order, punishable under the contempt
statutes. Therefore, the substantive law and the procedural rule are consistent and not in conflict.

See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 P.3d 912, 916 (2008) ("When a statute and rule
can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict between them, they should be so
interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that results in a conflict.") (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
This Court has been granted authority to make procedural rules that effectuate the
substantive laws of this state. LC.§§ 1-212, 1-213; State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 540-41,
700 P.2d 942, 943-44 (1985). The "line of demarcation" between substantive law and procedural
rules has been explained by this Court as follows:
Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and
punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, and
regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain
to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which
substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated.

Id. at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 527 P.2d 674, 676-77
(1974)).

In this case, LC.§ 18-920 provides the substantive law, to wit: "A no contact order may
be imposed by the court or by Idaho criminal rule." LC. § 18-920(1 ). A violation of a no contact
order is committed when:
(a) A person has been charged or convicted under any offense
defined in subsection (1) ofthis section; and
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The criminal rule uses the words "shall" and "must" in defining a no contact order. The
words "shall" and "must" are mandatory. Twin Falls Cnty. v. Idaho Comm'n on Redistricting,
152 Idaho 346, 349, 271 P.3d 1202, 1205 (2012). The word "should" is not mandatory. Id
The State and the lower courts have mistakenly treated Hillbroom's legal argument as
promoting the addition of a "new" element to the crime of violation of a no contact order. That
is incorrect. Hillbroom argues that implicit in the existing element, "A no contact order has been
issued ... " (LC. § 18-920(2)(b), is that the order issued by the court be a valid one. Surely the
legislature intended that only valid orders be subject to enforcement. However, the statute does
not define a no contact order or distinguish the no contact order issued pursuant to LC. § 18-920
from a general protection order, punishable under LC. § 39-6312, or from a plain vanilla court
order, punishable under the civil and criminal contempt statues, LC. §§ 7-610, 18-1801. The
authority to define the contents of the no contact order was left to this Court by a substantive
provision in the statute and by the Court's independent rule making authority under LC. §§ 1212, 1-213.
The State urges this Court to ignore the mandatory provisions in the criminal rule that
effectuates I.C. § 18-920. In essence, the State reads the words "shall" and "must" as "should,"
as in, "no contact orders 'should' contain, at a minimum, the following information.... " But
that is not what the rule says. The rule says a no contact order issued pursuant to LC. § 18-920
"must" contain, inter alia, an expiration date certain.

To follow the State's logic to its

conclusion, a no contact order would remain valid even if the order was not "in writing," failed
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to contain a "distance restriction," or failed to contain or misidentified the "victim's name." All
those items are required under the criminal rule but not mentioned in the statute. The State's
strained reading of the rule cannot be correct because its reading simply eviscerates the rule, or
in legal parlance, renders it mere surplusage.
In a nutshell, an order issued pursuant to LC. § 18-920 that fails to satisfy the mandatory
requirements of I.C.R. 46.2 is NOT A "NO CONTACT ORDER." Rather, it's a plain vanilla
court order. There's recent precedence for applying a criminal rule in this way. This Court in
Reed v. Reed, 157 Idaho 705,339 P.3d 1109 (2014), reh'g denied (Jan. 14, 2015), considered the
validity of judgments that failed to strictly comply with I.R.C.P. 54(a). The Court stated: "[T]he
purported judgments issued on February 24, 2011, were not judgments, because they did not
comply with the rule." Id. at_, 339 P.3 rd at 1126. Similarly, the order issued to Hillbroom is
not a no contact order because it does not comply with the rule.
B.

An offender who violates an invalid no contact order remains subject to a
judgment of contempt.

The State argues that a strict application of the I.C.R. 46.2 would permit an offender, who
knows the order to be invalid, to contact the victim "without fear of criminal prosecution or other
consequence." That is not Hillbroom's legal position. Hillbroom argues there is recourse under
the contempt statute for violating a court's order.
The State relies on In re Contempt of Reeves, 112 Idaho 574, 733 P.2d 795 (Ct. App.
1987) for the proposition that an order that fails to comply with I.R.C. 46.2 remains punishable
under LC. § 18-920 so long as it is not "transparently invalid." Such reliance is misplaced.
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Reeves is a case of contempt arising out of a divorce action where the la\\iyer, Reeves,
advised his client to ignore an ex parte protective order on grounds that the order failed to
comply with the applicable civil rule, I.R.C.P. 65(b). Id at 576, 733 P.2d at 797. I.R.C.P. 65 is
the civil rule generally applicable to all injunctions and restraining orders. The Reeves court
concluded that the ex parte protective order, while non-compliant with I.R.C.P. 65(b) was
possibly valid because "I.R.C.P. 65(g) stands on its O\\ill, and the rule contains no suggestion that
it is limited by the protections of Rule 65(b)." Id. at 581, 733 P.2d at 802. But, because the
Reeves court was uncertain as to which rule applied, it adopted a new rule, to wit: "While the
validity of the order is a close issue, we believe the order was not so lacking in merit as to be
"transparently invalid." Id; accord Bayes v. State, 117 Idaho 96, 100, 785 P.2d 660, 664 (Ct.
App. 1989).
This Court has not adopted the "transparently invalid" standard. Indeed, it has not been
heard from since 1989. This Court may find, consistent with its holding in Reed v. Reed, that a
valid temporary restraining order must strictly comply with the mandatory requirements of
I.R.C.P. 65(b). But, perhaps there is a better analysis that should have been applied in Reeves to
uphold the judgment of contempt: the legislature set forth the substantive law regarding the
power of the trial court to compel obedience to its orders and that power may not be abridged by
court rule. Idaho Code § 1-1603 provides that "Every court has the power ... To compel
obedience to its judgments, orders and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court in an
action or proceeding pending therein." LC. § 1-1603(4) (emphasis added). Thus, this Court is
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without authority to promulgate rules that diminish the statutory enforcement authority granted
to "every" court through the contempt statutes. See State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d
891, 893 (1992) (statutory provision on time to appeal a death sentence conviction held
substantive and precluded discretion granted in criminal rule); see also Two Jinn, Inc. v. Dist.

Court of the Fourth Judicial Dist., 150 Idaho 647, 655, 249 P.3d 840, 848 (2011) (court lacked
authority to promulgate certain sections of the Bail Bond Guidelines because "they purport to
make the bail agent personally liable on the surety bond bail bond.")
The State's reliance on Reeves is misplaced because criminal prosecution under LC. § 18920 is different than enforcement through a contempt action. If the ex parte restraining order
enforced in Reeves is held invalid, the court is then left without any enforcement authority under
its general power to compel obedience to its lawful orders. See In re Weick, 142 Idaho 275, 279,
127 P.3d 178, 182 (2005) ("Courts have the contempt power in order to preserve their
effectiveness and sustain their inherent and statutory power."). That is not the case with an
invalid no contact order. An order found invalid pursuant to LC. § 18-920 and LC.R. 46.2,
remains punishable under the general contempt power of the issuing court so long as the
violation is found to be "willful." Id at 279, 127 P.3d at 182 ("This Court has long recognized
implicitly that one's violation of a court order must be willful to justify an order of contempt.").
LC.§ 18-105; State v. Rice, 145 Idaho 554,556, 181 P.3d 480,482 (2008).
Why, one might ask, should an order held invalid as a no contact order remain punishable
under the contempt statutes? The reason and the distinction is in the mens rea element. Idaho

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT ON REVIEW - 10

Code § 18-920 allows a special form of protective order, prosecuted as a separate crime, by a
separate court, and most significantly, having no intent element. It is a strict liability offense.
Consequently, this Court very carefully set forth the mandatory criteria for a valid no contact
order in I.C.R. 46.2. It has repeatedly admonished the trial courts about complying with the rule.
See, e.g., State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 176, 177 P.3d 387,390 (2008) ("[W]e expect judges to
provide a termination date, regardless of whether the motion to modify or terminate the no
contact order is granted").
Thus, because LC. § 18-920 is a strict liability offense, always punished as a
misdemeanor or felony, the State and the magistrate should be held to the same strict standards
of compliance as is the defendant. Indeed, one might turn the State's argument back on itself:
failure to strictly enforce I.C.R. 46.2 allows the State and the courts to violate the rule with
impunity, which up to now they have done!

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should remand Hillbroom's case back to the

magistrate for dismissal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

of March, 2015.

BERG & McLA!]GHtfN, CHTD
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/Attorney for Junior Larry Hillbroom
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